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ABSTRACT
This article considers the history of Swedish attitudes towards Baltic independ-
ence during the short twentieth century (1914–91), focusing primarily on the 
years when Baltic independence was gained (1918–20) and regained (1989–91). 
The former was characterized by Swedish skepticism towards the ability of the 
Baltic states to retain their independence long-term, considering the inevitable 
revival of Russian power. Sweden became one of the very few Western coun-
tries to officially recognize the incorporation of the Baltic states in the Soviet 
Union in the Second World War. During the Cold War, Sweden gained a rep-
utation for its policy of activist internationalism and support for democrati-
zation in the Third World, but for security-related reasons it ignored breaches 
of human rights and deficit of democracy in its immediate neighborhood, the 
Soviet Union and the Baltic republics. However, in 1989–91 the unprecedented 
decline in Soviet influence, the value-based approach in international relations, 
feelings of guilt over previous pragmatism, and changes in domestic politics 
encouraged Sweden to support Baltic independence, and to take on the role of 
an active manager of the Baltic post-soviet transition.
Keywords: Baltic independence, Sweden, political history
In the decades following World War II, Sweden played an ambivalent and 
– at least to a Baltic observer – confusing role in international politics. 
Its foreign policy was characterized by something of a moralistic stance, 
exemplified by the famously strict Swedish military nonalignment policy, 
value entrepreneurship in areas such as democratization, environmentalism 
This article is published as a part of the project “Estonia, the Baltic states and the collapse 
of the Soviet Union: new perspectives on the end of the Cold War” (PUT683). The author 
wishes to thank Carl Marklund for his very helpful comments during the writing process.
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and gender equality,1 and promotion of international development assis-
tance and conflict mediation under the aegis of “solidarity”.2 One might 
assume that the same principles of activist internationalism would have 
extended to Sweden’s immediate geographical vicinity in the eastern part 
of the Baltic Sea region. In this narrower context, however, Swedish pol-
icy can just as justly be criticized for its lack of initiative, overtly cautious 
attitudes towards political developments threatening the status quo, and 
even spinelessness in reaction to great power demands. Perhaps the readi-
est examples can be found in the ways that Swedish governments accom-
modated various Soviet requests during the Cold War, and their often dis-
missive attitude towards independence movements in what are now again 
the three Baltic states.
This ambivalent nature of Swedish policy can most intuitively be 
explained as something determined by the fundamentally unequal rela-
tionship between a world superpower, the Soviet Union, and a small neu-
tral state, Sweden. Whilst freer to act proactively and spread its soft power 
in more distant parts of the world, it is easy to see why Sweden’s immedi-
ate security needs in the Baltic Sea area would have made its local foreign 
policy passive and noncommittal – either as a result of the overwhelm-
ing military danger projected by the USSR, of self-inflicted cautiousness, 
or a combination of both. It is clear, however, that such two-faced policy 
configuration of global activism and local passivism was also acceptable 
to the two world superpowers, the US and the USSR, who could make use 
of the neutrals as convenient actors-in-between or spaces of negotiation 
when such neutral ground was needed.
At the same time, while avoiding infringement on Soviet interests, 
Sweden also retained a capability for steps that could go against this gen-
eral policy. Over the course of the end of World War II and the Cold War, 
Sweden accepted refugees from the Baltic states, Hungary, Czechoslova-
kia and Poland, and vocally criticized the Soviet/Warsaw Pact interven-
tion in Czechoslovakia in 1968. For much of this period, it also maintained 
a clandestine security cooperation with NATO in complete contradiction 
1  Christine Ingebritsen, “Norm enterpreneurs. Scandinavia’s role in world politics”, 
Cooperation and Conflict, 37:1 (2002), 11–23. 
2  Christine Agius, The social construction of Swedish neutrality: challenges to Swedish 
identity and sovereignty (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2006), 107–116; Lars 
Trädgårdh, “Sweden and the EU: welfare state nationalism and the spectre of Europe”, 
European integration and national identity: the challenge of the Nordic states, ed. by Lene 
Hansen and Ole Wæver (London/New York: Routledge, 2002), 130–181.
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to its stated official policy.3 Most significantly for the purposes of this arti-
cle, when a window of opportunity appeared at the end of the Cold War, 
Sweden was among the earliest Western states to adopt a form of “duck 
policy”4 vis-à-vis the emerging Baltic states: prepared to support the cause 
of their independence with means not always entirely open or in the best 
interests of Swedish-Soviet friendship.
This article has relatively little to say about the Cold War itself. In the 
post-World War II decades’ Swedish politics, there was likely no serious 
attention paid to the possibility that the independent Baltic states might 
one day be restored. These decades were, however, preceded by the inter-
war era and followed by the détente of the late Cold War and post-Cold 
War era, when the issue of Baltic independence became too pressing for 
Sweden to ignore. Therefore, I think it would be a useful exercise to con-
sider the so-called short twentieth century (1914–91)5 in Swedish-Baltic 
relations by focusing primarily on these two pivotal periods: the unex-
pected appearance of the three new states in the final stage and aftermath 
of World War I, and their equally unexpected re-appearance in 1989–91. 
As the starting and the end point of Swedish skepticism towards Baltic 
independence, they frame, at least from a Baltic perspective, a certain 
era in Swedish foreign political attitudes and understanding them should 
therefore make a contribution towards understanding twentieth-century 
Swedish foreign policy in general.
It hardly needs to be emphasized that, for various reasons, the follow-
ing examination can only be very preliminary. Nevertheless, I hope to be 
able to demonstrate that the Swedish skepticism was initially anchored in 
generally negative attitudes about “the East” as underdeveloped and dan-
gerous, but more importantly in the assumed “eternal” character of Russia 
and its security/geopolitical interests.6 These assumptions fed into a long-
term tradition in Swedish politics which associated “activism” in the east 
with irresponsible and “adventurous” foreign policy.
Significant changes in Swedish attitudes first took place in the final 
stage and the immediate aftermath of the Cold War, when a convergence 
3  About the secret Swedish-NATO cooperation, see Mikael Holmström, Den dolda 
alliansen: Sveriges hemliga NATO-förbindelser (Stockholm: Atlantis, 2011).
4  As described by Lars Fredén: “smooth and unruffled on the surface, but paddling 
like hell underneath”. See Lars Fredén, Förvandlingar. Baltikums frigörelse och svensk 
diplomati 1989–1991 (Stockholm: Atlantis, 2004), 193.
5  A term proposed by Iván Berend and Eric Hobsbawm. See Eric Hobsbawm, Age of 
extremes: the short twentieth century, 1914–1991 (London: Abacus, 1995).
6  This also hampered interwar-era Swedish cooperation with Finland and Poland.
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between domestic and international factors created a uniquely favorable 
policy environment facilitating Swedish support for the Baltic liberation 
movements and then the newly independent Baltic states. Thereby, a much 
more optimistic period was initiated in Swedish-Baltic relations, paving 
the way for ever-tighter economic and political integration in the decades 
that have followed.
Conceptual and explanatory issues
In order to understand the nature and significance of this change in Swed-
ish policy, several explanatory contexts must be taken into account. It is not 
sufficient to simply point out the “geopolitical facts” – i. e. Sweden’s close-
ness to Russia, and then to the USSR (and then to Russia again) – as the 
universal determinant of Swedish policy. A nuanced analysis must allow 
for innovation as well as for continuities, and it needs to place Swedish pol-
icy in the context of its domestic factors including, for example, the resil-
ience of the Swedish neutrality doctrine and the historically unfavorable 
connotations attached to “activism” in the Baltic. Last but not least, even 
geopolitical facts are subject to changing interpretations, no matter how 
“eternal” they might appear on the first sight.
Furthermore, there are conceptual issues to discuss. Assuming that the 
underlying Swedish attitude at all times was cautiousness in Baltic matters, 
it could be argued that the increasingly active support for Baltic independ-
ence in the period 1989–91 was just as much a product of this cautiousness, 
as had been the passivism of the interwar era. In this view, what actually 
changed was the perception of which policy cause would be most “cau-
tious”, reflecting the fact that the international situation and Sweden’s cir-
cumstances in the interwar period made “the course of least resistance” 
different from the one in 1989–91.7
While the above is certainly true on some level of generalization, I would 
argue there is still room for a more basic-level policy developmental per-
spective. For Swedish political elites, it was unprecedented to take on the 
view that Baltic independence was something sustainable in principle, as 
well as desirable enough for Sweden to justify (or perhaps also to provide 
an excuse for?) giving up its traditional policy of nonalignment in the Baltic 
region. It is also clear that both in spirit and actual significance, the steps 
that Sweden took to help and encourage Baltic independence movements in 
this period went beyond the bare minimum it had done for the independent 
7  Carl Marklund, personal communication 31 August 2016.
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Baltic states during their first emergence in 1918–20 – even if back then it 
had had potentially freer hands when threatened only by a very young and 
weak Soviet Russia, rather than the declining world superpower USSR.
Of course, the point about “freer hands” must also be qualified. For 
example, it seems that there was some potential for Swedish military inter-
vention in the Russian successor states in 1918–19, exemplified by its offi-
cially sanctioned Åland adventure in early 1918,8 but also by the unofficial 
recruitment of Swedish volunteers into the Finnish Civil War and the Esto-
nian War of Independence.9 Therefore, if activism in Baltic matters is to 
be defined as intervention, there was certainly more of it in the late World 
War I and early interwar period. However, it is important to point out that 
this early activism did not necessarily imply supporting Baltic independ-
ence. From Swedish perspective, the purpose of the unofficial intervention 
plans in the Baltics in 1918–19 was to hinder the spread of Bolshevism, not 
to prop up the national democratic governments – if, indeed, there was no 
intention to overthrow them.10
At the end stage of the Cold War, any military intervention was probably 
completely out of the question. On the other hand, Sweden could be much 
more confident in its soft power appeal due to the obvious Soviet failures 
and Sweden’s own remarkable successes over the post-World War II dec-
ades, as well as the fact that unlike in 1918–19, Swedish political elites had 
no reason to feel threatened by their domestic Soviet sympathizers.11 Even 
more significantly, the domestic and international situation that Sweden 
found itself in was such that it encouraged novel initiatives putting this 
soft power into new uses, revamping long-held political convictions in the 
process. As will be argued below, it was this position of relative soft power 
strength, combined with a more general need for policy innovation, that – 
after some initial hesitation – facilitated Sweden’s strong stance of support 
for Baltic independence and Baltic-Nordic cooperation, something that 
had never been the case in the interwar era.
Another important context to be taken into account are the right-left 
fluctuations in Swedish politics. There was, and in some ways still is, a 
8  See e. g. Herbert Tingsten, Svensk utrikesdebatt mellan världskrigen (Stockholm: 
Bonniers, 1964), 89–149.
9  See Mart Kuldkepp, “Eesti Vabadussõja vabatahtlike värbamine Rootsis”, Õpetatud 
Eesti Seltsi Aastaraamat 2013 (Tartu, 2013), 191–209.
10  See Mart Kuldkepp, “Kaks majorit kahel pool Läänemerd: väljaöeldu ja väljamõeldu 
Carl Axel Mothanderi romaanis “President””, Akadeemia, 2 (2014), 251–257.
11  About the revolution fears in Sweden in 1917–18, see Carl Göran Andræ, Revolt eller 
reform. Sverige inför revolutionerna i Europa 1917–1918 (Stockholm: Carlssons, 1998).
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long-standing foreign policy tension between the left wing (mainly social 
democrats, but also the liberals) and the right wing (above all the conserva-
tives). The left-wing politicians have typically seen the international system 
(League of Nations and then the United Nations) as the firmest security 
arrangement available for Sweden, preferring it to more limited regional 
alliances or commitments.12 This has been in contrast to typical conserv-
atives, who have tended to conceive of a Swedish “special mission” in its 
immediate geographical vicinity – often, but not always based upon his-
torical precedent13 – while considering international commitments more 
secondary or even against Swedish interests.14 In a sharp way, this is still 
evidenced in a Swedish right-wing sense of “Baltic commitment” (and 
shame/anger regarding Cold War passivity towards the USSR) in contrast 
to the Swedish left-wing feelings of “Third World solidarity” (and shame/
anger regarding Cold War compliancy towards the US). These sentiments 
have been mutually constitutive and are frequently played out against one 
another.
Therefore, Sweden’s proclivity for regionally limited commitments has 
been closely linked to the domestic political situation, and the fortunes 
of respective parties. The extremely long reign of the social democrats in 
the Cold War era certainly played a role in the absence of the Baltics in 
Swedish political discourse, as they were downplayed in preference for a 
broader internationalist approach. Since the Baltic region remained ear-
marked as a conservative concern, it is therefore only natural that the new 
right-wing cabinet of Carl Bildt from autumn 1991 onwards was instru-
mental in consolidating and fully legitimizing top-level Swedish support 
for Baltic independence.
Yet the explanatory power of domestic party politics is limited in this 
case. No right wing Swedish governments before Carl Bildt’s can be con-
sidered to have been true believers in Baltic independence. On the other 
hand, a strong stance of Swedish support for it made its appearance already 
12  About the internationalist tradition in Swedish foreign policy, see Kjell Goldmann, 
“The Swedish model of security policy”, West European Politics, 14:3 (1991), 122–143. 
13  See Mart Kuldkepp, “Sweden’s historical mission and World War I: a regionalist theory 
of Swedish activism”, Scandinavian Journal of History, 39:1 (2014), 126–145. 
14  About the conservative skepticism towards the League of Nations, see L. Torbjörn 
Norman, “Ansiktet mot öster: Svensk nationalism mot Nationernas förbund”, Väst möter 
öst: Norden och Ryssland genom historien, ed. by Max Engman (Stockholm: Carlsson, 
1996) and L. Torbjörn Norman, “‘A foreign policy other than the old neutrality.’ Aspects 
of Swedish foreign policy after the First World War”, The Baltic in international rela-
tions between the two World Wars, ed. by John Hiden and Aleksander Loit (Stockholm: 
Centre for Baltic Studies, 1988), 236–238.
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in the final years of Ingvar Carlsson’s first government, a social democratic 
one. There is thus a need to also take into account other explanatory fac-
tors, likely to be found in international developments and the changing 
expectations connected to them.
Sweden, Russia and activism in the Baltic
Beyond the differences between main Swedish political parties, all of them 
have for a long time subscribed to a view of Russia being the main geopo-
litical threat to Sweden.15 This basic assumption has had a decisive impor-
tance for the development of Swedish political imagination, and thereby 
naturally also the way that the Baltic states have fit into it. In fact, Swed-
ish attitudes towards the emergence of Baltic independence can justifiably 
be seen as responses to a major challenge that the Baltic states’ existence 
posed to the basic essence of the Swedish security policy: its avoidance of 
conflict with Russia.
Ultimately, this principal reluctance to anger Russia can be followed 
back to Jean-Baptiste Bernadotte’s so-called policy of 1812, which aimed 
to quell any further anti-Russian revanchism in Sweden following the loss 
of Finland to Russia in 1809. The former Napoleonic marshal Bernadotte, 
who in the aftermath of this national catastrophe was elected as the heir-
presumptive of Sweden in 1810 and crowned the King of Sweden (as Carl 
XIV Johan) in 1818, was successful in re-orientating Swedish expansion-
ism towards Norway, which, following a short war in 1814, was with Rus-
sian blessings converted into a Swedish protectorate for the next 90 years.16 
Further tensions with Russia were thereby largely, if not entirely avoided, 
cementing a security configuration which was suitable for both states. In 
hindsight, it could be argued that it was from that point onwards, after 
Sweden had turned its back to the Baltic Sea and further conflict with the 
hereditary enemy Russia, that Sweden shed the warlike reputation which 
had been following it since the sixteenth century, and became the state 
15  See e. g. Gunnar Åselius, “The “Russian menace” to Sweden”, The belief system of a small 
power security élite in the age of imperialism (Stockholm: University of Stockholm, 1994). 
This idea of “Russian menace” has to a degree been counterbalanced by an alternative 
image of Russia as a land of opportunity for Swedish manufacturing and commerce. 
See Carl Marklund, “A Swedish Drang nach Osten? Baltic-Nordic pendulum swings and 
Swedish conservative geopolitics”, Ajalooline Ajakiri, 3 (2015), 223–248.
16  Thomas Munch-Petersen, “The policy of 1812: Swedish foreign policy from the Con-
gress of Vienna to the outbreak of the Crimean War”, Northern Studies, 31 (1996), 37–56.
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widely admired today: one that has stayed out of war already for more 
than 200 years.
The long period of successful neutrality in the nineteenth and the twen-
tieth centuries created a strong tradition in Swedish politics which associ-
ated peace and prosperity with neutrality, and neutrality with the appease-
ment of Russia. With dogged determination, Sweden held onto this policy 
more or less until 1995 when it joined the EU. Active foreign policy in the 
Baltic, or activism, as it was known as in Sweden, was conversely associated 
with loss of territory and political misfortune, as historical lessons from 
the Great Northern War onwards appeared to demonstrate.
The designation of activism is rather telling, since the appeasement of 
Russia in Swedish policymaking was manifested not so much in any par-
ticular concessions to Russian interests, but in a general passiveness in 
pursuing any lines of policy that could or would have led to a conflict with 
Russia. In the post-1809 and pre-1917 times, this was most prominently 
exemplified by the general Swedish refusal to pursue a revanchist line 
in the Finnish question. This refusal was not, of course, entirely unchal-
lenged and there always remained a revisionist undercurrent in Swedish 
public opinion which continued to see Russia as a threat to be eliminated 
by active means. Due to the rise of anti-Russian and pro-Finnish opinion, 
especially among the Scandinavist liberals, Sweden came close to partici-
pating in the Crimean War against Russia in the 1850s. The 1855 November 
Treaty, in which Sweden pledged to not to cede any northern territory to 
Russia, in exchange for allied help in case of a Russian invasion, is usually 
taken to signify the end of the original policy of 1812.17
During the First World War, activist anti-Russian sentiment was again 
gaining prominence, leading to proposals of Swedish alliance with Ger-
many and a joint campaign in Finland against St. Petersburg. The activists 
regarded Swedish neutrality policy as shameful and dangerous in this era 
of great struggles, and saw in joint Swedish-German re-conquest of Fin-
land a chance of reestablishing Sweden as a regional economic and military 
great power presiding over a federation of Baltic Sea states. The latter might 
also have included the Baltic German-dominated Baltic provinces, but it is 
important to note that Swedish activists were hardly supporters of Estonian 
or Latvian independence. In activist propaganda, it was Svärdriddarordens 
Baltien – the Balticum of the Teutonic Knights – that they envisioned as 
17  Ole Elgström, Images and strategies for autonomy: explaining Swedish security policy 
strategies in the 19th century (Springer, 2000), 93, 57.
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the new state to be separated from Russia.18 They certainly did not have in 
mind a region of small nation states fragmented along ethnic lines.
The activists were a cross-party group of mainly young nationalist 
conservatives and German-friendly social democrats, but also included 
some General Staff officers and several high-standing members of estab-
lished right-wing political elites. However, activism never became anything 
approaching a mass movement, and found only very limited support in 
the parliament and government.19 The activist plans furthermore naturally 
hinged on German victory, which was not forthcoming. After the war, it 
thus appeared that Sweden had avoided a major danger by not giving in 
to their propaganda, and that the correctness of the neutrality policy had 
been reaffirmed. A similar episode occurred during World War II, when 
proposals were made in 1941 by the supreme commander of Swedish defense 
forces, Olof Thörnell, to send Swedish expeditionary forces over to Finland 
to fight against the Soviet Union (and thereby, effectively, side with Nazi 
Germany). These, however were met with even more skepticism and never 
reached public consciousness.20
Beyond the German-friendly activists, there were other and more mod-
erate Swedish voices amidst lackluster Swedish attitudes calling for more 
active engagement with the eastern half of the Baltic Sea region, sometimes 
also embracing the idea of Baltic independence.21 However, as will be seen, 
mainstream political belief in the sustainability of Baltic independence 
appeared relatively late, even if its desirability in principle (vis-à-vis Swed-
ish national interests) was recognized much earlier.
 
18  Sveriges utrikespolitik i världskrigets belysning (Stockholm: AB Nordiska Bokhandeln, 
1915), 72.
19  Kuldkepp, Sweden’s historical mission and World War I; Mart Kuldkepp, “Hegemony 
and liberation in World War I: the plans for new Mare Nostrum Balticum”, Ajalooline 
Ajakiri, 3 (2015), 249–286. 
20  Klas Åmark, Att bo granne med ondskan. Sveriges förhållande till nazismen, Nazitysk-
land och Förintelsen, Utökad och reviderad utgåva (Stockholm: Bonniers, 2011), 64–65.
21  E. g. the Dagens Nyheter journalist Ejnar Fors Bergström who was instrumental in 
assisting the first official Estonian foreign representative Jaan Tõnisson in Stockholm 
in the spring of 1918: Ejnar Fors Bergström, Minnen från ett händelserikt liv (Samfundet 
Sverige-Island, 1983), 18–19.
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Sweden and the Baltic question in 1918–19
The Russian October Revolution in the autumn of 1917 and the defeat of 
Germany a year later meant that by the beginning of the interwar era, 
Sweden’s geopolitical situation was suddenly much better than it had ever 
been since the Napoleonic Wars. Neither Soviet Russia, caught in a bloody 
civil war, nor the worn-out and defeated Germany could in any near future 
assert itself as the new ruler of the Baltic Sea. Furthermore, a row of new 
nation states had appeared on the other side of the sea – Finland, Estonia, 
Latvia, Lithuania and Poland – constituting a buffer zone that could shield 
Sweden from Russian danger.
At the same time, the situation had become more complicated in other 
ways. The habitual stability in the region, based on a balance between the 
great powers, had already been upset during the war and now disappeared 
completely. Instead of long-established empires and monarchies, Sweden 
now had to face new and shaky nation states, as well as the entirely unprec-
edented and unpredictable phenomenon of Communist Russia.22
The young Baltic states, deeply aware of their own weakness, were put-
ting great hopes on Sweden. Especially for Estonians, the idea of politi-
cal alignment with Sweden and the rest of Scandinavia represented a 
possible way towards secure national autonomy and later independence, 
encouraged by the traditionally Swedish-friendly sentiment in Estonian 
nationalism.23 Already in the autumn of 1917, when the Estonian Tempo-
rary Diet (Maapäev) debated for the first time Estonia’s possible separa-
tion from Russia and the ways to avoid the threat of German occupation, 
Jaan Tõnisson proposed that Estonia should “go active” and take the ini-
tiative in creating a Nordic-Baltic federation of small states presided over 
by Sweden, the leading neutral state in the region. In autumn 1918, Esto-
nian diplomats Ants Piip and Karl-Robert Pusta submitted essentially the 
same plan of federalization and neutralization of the Baltic Sea region to 
the government of Great Britain, asking it to become the protector of the 
so-called Baltic League, a future federation of small states. The British, who 
had already been discussing similar ideas, welcomed this sign of Estonian 
willingness, and the plan was presented to Sweden.24
22  Wilhelm M. Carlgren, Sverige och Baltikum: från mellankrigstid till efterkrigsår: en 
översikt (Stockholm: Publica, 1993), 11–12.
23  See Mart Kuldkepp, “The Scandinavian connection in early Estonian nationalism”, 
Journal of Baltic Studies, 3:44 (2013), 313–338. 
24  Jaan Tõnisson Eesti välispoliitikas 1917–1920: dokumente ja materjale, ed. by Heino 
Arumäe (Tallinn: Jaan Tõnissoni Instituudi kirjastus, 1993), 9–17; Marko Lehti, 
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In Sweden, however, the conditions for the plan’s reception were less 
than ideal. The traditional right-wing political elites still remained broadly 
German-friendly, and were very unlikely to make a common cause with 
the anti-German Baltic nationalists. During the German occupation of the 
Baltic states in 1918, the Swedish envoy to St. Petersburg Edvard Bränd-
ström had, at a meeting with a representative of the Latvian Temporary 
Government, outright dismissed the idea that neutral Sweden would get 
involved in Baltic affairs in conflict with the interests of Germany as the 
occupying power.25
By that point, however, the power of the traditional political elites was 
waning. The end stage of the war and the immediate post-war era were 
marked by an unprecedented turn to the left in Swedish politics. In 1917, a 
new liberal-social democratic coalition cabinet of Nils Edén came to power. 
This first democratically elected government in Swedish history was in 
1920 followed by the first fully social democratic cabinet under Hjalmar 
Branting. Even though this government lasted only for the better part of 
1920, and was thereafter replaced by the non-partisan cabinet of Louis De 
Geer, its existence gave ample evidence of how thorough the changes in 
the Swedish political landscape had been.
There is little doubt that these new developments also contributed to a 
relative Swedish passivism in Baltic matters. From the outset of the war, 
Swedish left wing and liberal elites had been deeply critical of the adven-
turous ideas of German-friendly activism.26 Now, when Great Britain 
seemed to be replacing Germany as the driving force behind Baltic-Nordic 
federalization, they again sensed that Sweden should remain devoted to 
the successful neutrality policy, and avoid being tempted by delusions of 
future grandeur.27 In particular, it had to resist the temptation of getting 
“Baltoscandia as a national construction”, Relations between the Nordic countries and the 
Baltic nations in the XX century, ed. by Kalervo Hovi (Turku: University of Turku, 1998), 
35; Marko Lehti, A Baltic League as a construct of the new Europe: envisioning a Baltic 
region and small state sovereignty in the aftermath of the First World War (Frankfurt/M., 
Berlin, Bern, New York, Paris, Wien: Peter Lang, 1999), 140–142; Charles Robert Pusta, 
“La ligue baltique”, Revue Baltique, 3–4 (1918), 68; Kaido Jaanson, “Põhjavalgus või fata-
morgaana? Balti-Skandinaavia liidu idee ja koostöö sünd ühest suurest sõjast teiseni”, 
Akadeemia, 9 (1990), 1896.
25  Andres Küng, Sverige och Estland: äntligen goda grannar? (Göteborg: Akademiför-
laget, 1991), 39.
26  See e. g. Johan Östling, Frisinnets krig: den kulturradikala svenska opinionen under 
första världskriget (Uppsala: Uppsala Universitet, Institutionen för idé- och lärdoms-
historia, 2002).
27  Jaanson, “Põhjavalgus või fatamorgaana?”, 1897; Erik Palmstierna, Orostid II. 1917–1919: 
politiska dagboksanteckningar (Stockholm: Tidens Förlag, 1953), 259.
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entangled in regional commitments relating to the question of the future 
of Russia, with Finland being the sole exception. Even in the Finnish case, 
Swedish engagement was limited. While the Edén government did launch 
the “humanitarian” Åland expedition in February 1918 – very much against 
the wishes of the white Vaasa government – it stopped short of officially 
condoning Swedish participation in the Finnish Civil War, allowing only 
for the unofficial recruitment of volunteers.28
Probably the only member of the Edén cabinet to be broadly in favor of 
joint Anglo-Swedish hegemony over a neutralized Baltic Sea was the social 
democratic minister for naval affairs, Erik Palmstierna, who had also been 
the main instigator behind the Swedish Åland expedition.29 Already in 
the autumn of 1918, Palmstierna envisioned a future for Sweden following 
German defeat in which “Finland, Estonia and Livonia” would become 
free, Swedish security would be assured due to weak Russia and “a mar-
ket towards Asia opened through Estonia”.30 Thereby he came close to the 
position advocated by the wartime activists;31 which indicates that there 
was some possibility for both right and left to identify joint “national” 
Swedish interests in the Baltic region beyond the fundamental conserva-
tive-socialist/liberal opposition. At the same time, this would have meant 
embracing the idea of Baltic independence – something that the Swedish 
elites were hardly prepared for.
Indeed, Palmstierna, with his background as a naval officer, was very 
much of an exception. The dominant socialist/liberal attitude, in addi-
tion to being generally skeptical about “adventures” and “militarism”, 
also reflected the conviction that such regional commitments would imply 
continuing channeling of resources into the armed forces, which would 
not only hamper domestic social reform, but could also potentially play 
into the hands of the conservative opposition. In fact, the government had 
committed itself to overturning the defense provision of 1914 and reduc-
ing military expenditure to peacetime levels already in 1917, long before 
the end of the war.32
28  See e. g. Torsten Gihl, Den svenska utrikespolitikens historia IV: 1914–1919 (Stockholm: 
Norstedts, 1951), 356–370.
29  Another example among the political elites was the liberal Swedish envoyé to Paris, 
Albert Ehrensvärd. See Norman, “A foreign policy other than the old neutrality”, 
244–246.
30  Palmstierna, Orostid II, 200.
31  See Marklund, “A Swedish Drang nach Osten?”
32  Hans Wieslander, I nedrustningens tecken. Intressen och aktiviteter kring försvarsfrågan 
1918–1925 (Lund: Gleerups, 1966), 4
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The defeat of Germany was therefore not a turning point in Swedish 
policy towards the Baltic states. Already in June 1918, the question of Baltic 
independence had been debated in a conference of Swedish, Danish and 
Norwegian prime and foreign ministers where it was decided that – with 
the exception of Finland – the Nordic countries would not formally rec-
ognize the independence of any Russian successor states and would con-
tinue the neutrality policy.33
The reasons behind this decision were most clearly formulated by prime 
minister Nils Edén in a secret speech in February 1919, already after the end 
of the war. There, Edén argued that it would be very dangerous for Sweden 
to become too closely involved with the separatist Baltic provinces who had 
only very slight possibilities of having their independence internationally 
recognized. But even if it would happen, Edén thought, they would not 
be able to retain it and would soon become embroiled in a new war with 
Russia. If Sweden by that point had developed too close ties to the Baltic 
states, it too would also be drawn into this war. Therefore, Swedish policy 
would be to not take on any responsibilities toward the Baltics, and not to 
give in to the temptation to take on a leading position in any federation. At 
the same time, the new states would be supported and their independence 
encouraged in ways not binding for Sweden.34 No-one present during the 
speech questioned the wisdom of Edén’s arguments, which meant that they 
were effectively accepted by all of the parties in the Swedish parliament.
Indeed, throughout the whole interwar period, Sweden went on to stick 
to this basic policy of passivism: supporting the Baltic states in noncom-
mittal ways where appropriate, but remaining distrustful of their long-
term prospects and therefore eschewing any closer political and military 
ties to them. Not least due to their close political cooperation with Sweden, 
Denmark and Norway adopted the same policy.35
Beyond the fear of Russia
In essence, Swedish cautiousness about Baltic independence was grounded 
in a view of “eternal” Russia as a temporarily weakened revisionist power 
that would soon rise again and reacquire its lost territory. Initially, this 
33  Seppo Zetterberg, “Der Weg zur Anerkennung der Selbständigkeit Estlands und 
Lettlands durch die skandinavischen Staaten 1918–1921”, Ostseeprovinzen, Baltische 
Staaten und das Nationale. Festschrift für Gert von Pistohlkors zum 70. Geburtstag, ed 
by Norbert Angermann, Michael Garleff, Wilhelm Lenz (Münster: Lit Verlag, 2005), 417.
34  Carlgren, Sverige och Baltikum, 14–15.
35  Zetterberg, “Der Weg zur Anerkennung der Selbständigkeit”, 425.
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view was likely combined with the expectation that the Communist rule 
would not last, and the Russian Empire would reconstitute itself. Later 
during the interwar era, however, Swedish discourse came to accept the 
USSR as a successor of the Tsarist state, with similar security interests in 
the Eastern Baltic and thereby a similar role vis-à-vis Sweden.
Combined with this dominant factor, however, there were some other 
issues that played a subordinate but still significant early role in inhibiting 
the development of a more pro-Baltic policy in Sweden. 
Especially in the Swedish right-wing circles, there existed a fear of Bol-
shevism in the Baltic states. Outside of the possibility that the Red Army 
might yet be victorious in the ongoing wars of independence, the lessons 
of the Finnish Civil War and the radicalization of the Sweden’s own lower 
and working classes during the last two years of the World War I easily 
roused the suspicions that the popular political movements in the Baltic 
provinces also represented some kind of Bolshevism or at least quasi-Bol-
shevism.36 This assumption played into the hands of the Baltic German 
lobby that, still very influential in the immediate aftermath of World War I, 
was happy to play the red card by pointing out, for example, the left-lean-
ing composition of the Estonian Constitutive Assembly, elected in 1919, 
and the revolutionary nature of Estonian land reform law of 1919, which 
stripped many of them of their land holdings and could be interpreted to 
constitute the denunciation of the concept of private property in general.37
In Swedish radical left-wing circles, there existed a different assumption: 
namely that the Baltic political elites were nothing but pawns in the hands 
of international capitalism, and British imperialism in particular. By a side 
sympathetic to the Soviet cause, the ongoing wars of independence were 
seen as the suppression of local working classes by a conspiracy bringing 
together foreign intervention and the class interests of the local upper and 
middle classes.38 Although this made the Swedish left a vocal opponent of 
military intervention in the Baltic, it is possible that this viewpoint, too, 
was influenced by Baltic German propaganda which for its own purposes 
36  See, e. g., the memorandum submitted to the Swedish Department of War by General 
Harald Hjalmarson, the former leader of the Swedish Brigade in the Finnish Civil War: 
Sveriges Krigsarkiv, Generalstaben, Utrikesavdelningen (H), F V Handlingar rörande 
Lettland, vol 1, P. M. rörande vissa förhållanden i Estland iakttagna vid en resa dit 
under tiden 7–19 januari 1919.
37  See Aleksander Loit, “Baltisaksa rüütelkondade seisukohad ja tegevus Eesti iseseis-
vumisel 1918–1920”, Tuna, 4 (2006), 60–61.
38  Palmstierna, Orostid II, 278.
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was also keen to point out the close links between the Baltic national move-
ments and the Entente powers, Great Britain in particular.39
Swedish elites also had concerns about the rise of nationalism in the for-
mer Baltic provinces. Likely anchored in orientalist stereotypes about the 
lack of culture and political restraint in “the east”,40 the assumption went 
that nationalist passions in the new Baltic States, now released after centu-
ries of inhibition, would turn on their former rulers.41 Such upstart nation-
alism was seen as immature and dangerous, particularly when directed 
against those that could be regarded as culturally or racially superior.42 
Even in this case, both the Finnish precedent and the Baltic German lobby 
likely played a role. In Finland, the conflicts between Finnish- and Swedish-
speakers had soon escalated after the achievement of Finnish independ-
ence, becoming especially topical in one of the most important Swedish 
foreign political issues of the day: the question of the future of the Åland 
islands. The Baltic Germans, for their part, were eager to express their 
dissatisfaction with the loss of political influence and the land reforms in 
terms of nationalist Estonians and Latvians suppressing them, motivated 
by national hatred.43 The Swedish conservatives, certainly feeling greater 
commonality with the “civilized” Baltic barons than with the new “uncul-
tured” elites, were furthermore afraid that this “oppression of Germanic 
peoples” would extend to the small minority group of Estonian Swedes,44 
which was having something of its own “Åland moment” in 1918–19, unsure 
whether to feel political allegiance to a national Estonian state or not.45
A further negative influence was the less than glorious Swedish participa-
tion in the Estonian War of Independence. In the autumn of 1918, Estonian 
and Latvian politicians, supported by Great Britain, unsuccessfully requested 
39  See, e. g., Eduard Laaman, Eesti iseseisvuse sünd (Stockholm: Vaba Eesti, 1964), 125–127.
40  For more about Swedish orientalism towards the Baltic states in the interwar period, 
see Sven Nordlund, “Självständiga stater eller östersjöprovinser? Mellankrigstidens 
svenska bilder av Baltikum”, Svenska överord: en bok om gränslöshet och begränsningar, 
ed. by Raoul Granqvist (Stockholm/Stenhag: Symposion, 1999), 96–98.
41  See “Östersjöfrågorna och freden. Dagens frågor”, Svensk Tidskrift, 1 (1919), 62.
42  Fredrik Eriksson, “Coping with a new security situation – Swedish military attachés 
in the Baltic 1919–1939”, Baltic Security and Defence Review, 15:2 (2013), 58–59.
43  See the memorandum submitted by Heinrich von Stryk, a former Land Marshal of 
Livonia to the Swedish Foreign Minister Johannes Hellner on January 6, 1919: Riks-
arkivet (Marieberg), UD 1902, 6 A 38, Vol. 287. See also Loit, “Baltisaksa rüütelkondade 
seisukohad ja tegevus”, 59.
44  "Östersjöfrågorna och freden", Dagens frågor, Svensk Tidskrift, 1 (1919), 62.
45  See Kari Alenius, “Unification with Sweden, autonomy, federal self-government? 
The dilemma of the Swedish minority of Estonia during the period between the World 
Wars,” Scandinavian Journal of History, 31:3–4 (2006), 308–327. 
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Swedish military intervention in the Baltic states following the retreat of Ger-
man regular forces after the end of the war. This was declined by the Swedish 
government with the argument that Sweden would not act independently of 
the Entente powers, even though it was also in Swedish interests to keep the 
Red Army away from the shore of the Baltic Sea.46 Subsequently, nationalist 
Baltic politicians tried their hand at recruiting Swedish volunteers to serve 
alongside Estonian and Latvian servicemen. Recruitment bureaus were set 
up in Stockholm, but owing to the lack of money and a wave of protests by 
the socialist movement, they succeeded in attracting only a limited number 
of volunteers, most of whom had been unable to find work after participat-
ing as volunteers on the white side in the Finnish Civil War. Not particu-
larly knowledgeable about or interested in helping the Estonian and Latvian 
national causes, they were generally motivated by money and mercenary 
adventurism similarly to the German ex-soldiers who went on to join the 
Freikorps fighting in the Baltics. The few Swedish volunteers who did arrive 
to Estonia – around 300 out of the originally intended 4000 – quickly made 
themselves known not for their military prowess, but a series of scandals 
culminating with a Swedish lieutenant being executed by his own comrades 
after a war tribunal of questionable lawfulness. This was widely reported in 
Swedish newspapers, contributing to the image of the Baltic states as a sort 
of wild east, where nothing but misfortune awaited.47
Sweden and the Baltic states 1920–89
During the interwar era, Swedish radical right-wing circles continued to 
advocate a “return” to more activist Baltic politics, which for them pri-
marily meant closer engagement with Finland.48 By contrast, social dem-
ocrats would use the accusation of “activism” against their conservative 
opponents,49 thereby branding them as backwards and irresponsible.
46  Kārlis Kangeris, “Die schwedische Baltikumpolitik 1918–1925: ein Überblick”, The 
Baltic in international relations between the two World Wars, ed. by John Hiden and 
Aleksander Loit (Stockholm: Centre for Baltic Studies, 1988), 188–189. For a more tho-
rough account, see Seppo Zetterberg, “Die schwedische Regierung und die baltische 
Krise im Herbst 1918”, Reval und die baltischen Länder: Festschrift für Hellmuth Weiss 
zum 80. Geburtstag, ed. by Jürgen von Hehn, Janos Kenez (Marburg an Lahn: Herder-
Institut, 1980), 75–89.
47  For an overview, see Kuldkepp, “Eesti Vabadussõja vabatahtlike värbamine Rootsis”.
48  See e. g. Marklund, “A Swedish Drang nach Osten?”, 236–240.
49  See e. g. the conservative response in the Swedish parliament to such attacks made 
during the election campaign of 1925: Riksdagens protokoll vid lagtima riksmötet år 1925: 
Andra kammeren, Vol. 5, 55 (24.05.1925, nr 39).
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Any Swedish support for significantly closer cooperation with the 
new Baltic states, however, was marginal indeed, with the overwhelming 
majority of conservatives, social democrats and liberals alike conceiving 
of the power difference between the small Baltic and Nordic states and 
Russia as far too wide to make any such ambitions sensible. As Fredrik 
Eriksson has pointed out, although the bastion of activism in Sweden – 
the conservative officer corps – tended to consider Finland a “natural and 
organic” state (even if under Soviet threat), they, too, saw Estonia, Latvia 
and Lithuania as having no future due to the likewise natural geopolitical 
interests of the USSR.50
 This Swedish fear of entanglements in the east also delayed the official 
recognition of Baltic independence. The first memorandum requesting the 
recognition of Estonian independence had been submitted to the Swed-
ish government already in March 1918, but had only led to the formulation 
of a joint Scandinavian policy against it, as described above.51 One reason 
why the recognition was refused was that the Scandinavian states were 
unsure whether the future belonged to Estonian and Latvian national-
ists, the Baltic barons with their idea of a united Baltic state, or the circles 
that advocated the Baltic states to remain a part of future democratic Rus-
sia.52 After another two years, however, the question was revisited. Once 
the Baltic Germans had been politically marginalized, the White Russian 
restauration movement had ebbed out in 1919, Estonia, Latvia and Lithu-
ania had made peace with Soviet Russia in 1920, and many other states had 
already recognized their independence, it made little sense to delay recog-
nition any longer. After all, as the now-foreign minister Erik Palmstierna 
had explicitly stated in 1920, Sweden had a real interest in the continuing 
existence of the Baltic states.53
This meant that now when the situation was stable enough, the formal 
recognition of the Baltic states would become an option. Once the West-
ern powers recognized Estonian and Latvian independence on 27 January, 
Sweden immediately followed suit on 2 February 1921 and the new Swedish 
government headed by prime minister Louis De Geer and foreign minister 
Herman Wrangel recognized de jure Estonian and Latvian independence 
(that of Lithuania followed on 26 September), after which formal diplo-
matic relations could be established.
50  Eriksson, Coping with the New Security Situation, 60.
51  Zetterberg, “Der Weg zur Anerkennung der Selbständigkeit”, 416.
52  Küng, Sverige och Estland, 40–41.
53  Carlgren, Sverige och Baltikum, 16.
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Following the recognition, Swedish-Baltic relations naturally improved, 
and Swedish cautiousness subsided somewhat, especially after all of the 
three new states were accepted into the League of Nations on 22 Septem-
ber 1921.54 However, it did not mean that prejudice about their long-term 
future was abandoned. This continuing skepticism was best exemplified 
in the attitudes of the Swedish envoy in the Baltic states, Torsten Undén 
(1922–28), who admitted that the new international situation which had 
come into being after the end of the Great War was essentially a welcome 
and favorable development for Sweden, but that the future of the new Bal-
tic states could nevertheless not to be seen as secure, meaning that Swe-
den should not take on any direct political or military responsibility for 
them.55 He also influenced the views of his brother Östen Undén, the social 
democratic foreign minister in 1924–26, who in the beginning of his tenure 
would only admit that as far as Estonian, Latvian and Lithuanian inde-
pendence was concerned, “Sweden of course had a certain, even if limited, 
interest in it”.56
Furthermore, Sweden saw a significant geopolitical threat in the sur-
vival of the idea of the Baltic League. After Sweden itself had rejected these 
plans, they now threatened to compete for the sympathies of Finland, which 
Sweden wanted to keep as its own buffer state unencumbered by any Bal-
tic connections. A potentially dangerous episode occurred in 1922, when 
Finland signed a defense treaty together with Estonia, Latvia and Poland 
that was to put these countries under obligation to cooperate in case of an 
unprovoked attack on one of them by a third party. The majority in the 
Finnish parliament, however, voted against the treaty’s ratification and the 
foreign minister, the main proponent of Finnish-Baltic cooperation Rudolf 
Holsti was forced to resign. This failure effectively hindered the develop-
ment of closer political ties between Finland and its southern neighbor 
states, and was welcomed in Sweden.57
The political fluctuations and frequent changes of government in the 
Baltic states were unfavorably reported in Swedish press, even though Swe-
den’s own politics in the 1920s were hardly less turbulent. In his 1926 report 
to the Swedish parliament’s foreign policy commission, foreign minister 
Undén blamed the political instability in the Baltics “partly on the lack 
of education and experience of the leaders”, but “mainly on the feeling of 
54  See Carlgren, Sverige och Baltikum, 18–19.
55  Ibid., 16–19.
56  Ibid., 21–22.
57  Ibid., 19–20. See also Lehti, A Baltic League as a construct of the new Europe, 394–396.
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weakness and doubt in their own long-term capability of being able to bear 
the burdens associated with independence”.58 Although there was certainly 
some truth in this assessment, it was no less a projection of Sweden’s own 
fears onto its Baltic neighbors.
All the same, the relations between the states continued to warm up 
until the end of the 1920s. In the Estonian case, this was exemplified by 
the state elder Jaan Tõnisson’s visit to Stockholm in 1928,59 as well as, most 
significantly, the visit of the Swedish king Gustav V to Tallinn in 1929.60 
Indeed, as Carlgren points out, these high-level contacts were the best evi-
dence yet that – in spite of all the evidence in contrary – Sweden neverthe-
less had an interest in the Baltic states. All the same, these visits remained 
ceremonial and did not translate into any real political commitments.61
The impossibility of the latter can be illustrated by an episode from 
autumn 1928, when it was proposed by Föreningen Norden, one of the first 
organizations of inter-Nordic cooperation (established in 1919), that Esto-
nia and Latvia might be accepted as its members. This relatively benign 
idea was immediately countered by both security concerns and cultural 
arguments: such relaxation of Swedish political restraint could bring about 
increased integration between Finland and the Baltic states, endangering 
Finland’s status as a Scandinavian state and thereby also Swedish secu-
rity; and it would also undermine inter-Nordic cultural cooperation by 
strengthening the Finnic component on the expense of the dominant Ger-
manic one. In the end, the Swedish government forced Föreningen Norden 
to give up any such plans.62
By the beginning of the 1930s, the possibility that Finland might choose 
a Baltic orientation over the Scandinavian one was already almost non-
existent, which meant that Sweden lost much of the little interest it had had 
in the Baltic states.63 As the international climate in Europe was growing 
tense, the interwar-era political relations never became as close again as 
they had been in 1928–29. While social democracy became the dominant 
political force in Sweden, authoritarian coups d’etat took place in Estonia 
58  Carlgren, Sverige och Baltikum, 22–23.
59  Hain Rebas, “Läänemere kolmnurgas. Meie suhetest rootslaste ja soomlastega 1918–”, 
Tulimuld, 3 (1986), 116.
60  Hans Lepp, “Rootsi kroonikandjate külaskäigud Eestisse XX sajandi esimesel poolel. 
Svenska kungliga besök i Estland under 1900-talets förra hälft”, Eesti ja Rootsi. Estland 
och Sverige, ed. by Anne-Marie Dahlberg and Toomas Tamla (Tallinn: Huma, 1993), 
127–134.
61  Carlgren, Sverige och Baltikum, 26.
62  Nordlund, “Självständiga stater eller östersjöprovinser?”, 105–106.
63  Carlgren, Sverige och Baltikum, 28.
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and Latvia in 1934 (in Lithuania, this had happened already in 1926), mean-
ing that different political regimes became a new reason – or a convenient 
excuse – to avoid closer cooperation.64
At the same time, the isolated Baltic states were increasing their attempts 
to intensify Baltic-Scandinavian cooperation for similarly security-related 
reasons. Although there were some Swedish politicians sympathetic to 
their ambitions, including the Swedish social democratic minister of for-
eign affairs Rickard Sandler, who visited all three Baltic states 1937, and 
the former mayor of Stockholm, Carl Lindhagen, who was very vocal in 
the Swedish parliament expressing his support for the Baltic states, they 
remained isolated on this issue.65 The Baltic politicians, too, had to take 
the hint. On 7 February 1937, the Estonian envoy in Sweden, Heinrich Lar-
etei, wrote to the Estonian minister of foreign affairs that Sweden is at any 
cost trying to avoid getting involved in military or political conflicts, and 
wants to retain its neutrality in the purest possible form. Therefore, closer 
political cooperation between Estonia and Sweden was out of the question 
“because Estonia, together with the other Baltic states, has a geopolitical 
position which, according to Sweden, can easily become a field of collision 
between the West and the East”. Therefore, Laretei suggested that Estonian 
politicians “for the time being eschew any official declarations concern-
ing our wish to seek political connection to Sweden, and limit themselves 
in such only to cultural and economic cooperation” and “avoid any kind 
of initiatives [in Swedish-Estonian relations] that could be interpreted by 
Sweden as political actions”.66
When the Baltic states were annexed by the Soviet Union in 1939–40, 
Sweden made itself notable by its near-total lack of protest over the events, 
in marked contrast to the reaction to the Soviet attack on Finland in 1939.67 
Second only to Nazi Germany (at the time a Soviet ally), Sweden was the 
first Western country – and one of the very few to ever do so – to recognize 
the incorporation of the Baltic States into the USSR as lawful. As Wilhelm 
M. Carlgren points out, this can be seen as the ultimate proof of Swedish 
conviction that their interwar-era Baltic policy had been the correct one.68
64  Ulf Larsson, Svensk socialdemokrati och Baltikum under mellankrigstiden (Stockholm: 
Centre for Baltic Studies, 1996), 52–65.
65  Ibid., 69–73.
66  Heino Arumäe, “Parimad soovid ja karm reaalsus: Ilmar Tõnissoni välispoliitilistest 
tõekspidamistest”, Akadeemia, 7 (1998), 1553, 1557.
67  See e. g. Martina Sprague, Swedish volunteers in the Russo-Finnish Winter War 
1939–1940 (Jefferson, North Carolina/London: McFarland & Company, 2000), 49–52.
68  Carlgren, Sverige och Baltikum, 48.
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It is therefore easy to see why in the post-World War II decades, Swed-
ish politics remained silent on the question of Baltic independence. As far 
as Sweden was concerned, the Baltic states did not exist any longer, and 
there is no indication that anybody among Swedish political elites believed 
that they would ever exist again. Yet, as already noted in the beginning 
of this article, Cold War-era Sweden could well take low-level steps that 
went against its overarching policy goals. Even concerning the Baltic issue, 
there were some ways that the “noncommittal” Swedish support continued.
This was most evident in the generally benevolent treatment of Baltic 
refugees. Over the course of the World War II, about 30 000 Estonians 
and 5 000 Latvians managed to flee to Sweden, most of them during the 
autumn of 1944 and the winter of 1944–45.69 This unprecedented wave of 
non-Nordic migration had a major influence on the development of sub-
sequent Swedish refugee policy, and is widely seen as a success story, as 
the refugees became for the most part very well integrated into the Swed-
ish society.70 The success was nevertheless tainted by the episode known 
as Baltutlämningen (“the extradition of Balts”) when Sweden extradited 
on Soviet demand 167 interned refugees, most of them Latvians, who had 
fought on German side in the war.71 The subsequent attempts to justify this 
antihumanitarian act furthermore tended to paint the extradited refugees 
as Nazi sympathizers, effectively adding insult to injury.72
Given that Sweden had recognized the annexation of the Baltic states 
as lawful, it is also understandable why it was not entirely tolerant of the 
inevitable political activities of the Baltic refugees. For example, the Esto-
nian exile government (1953) was not allowed to constitute itself in Sweden 
and had to do so in Oslo, Norway. After the fact, however, the Estonian 
exile president, social democrat August Rei was informed by the Swed-
ish foreign ministry that the exile government would be allowed to “exist, 
but not act in Sweden”, which could nevertheless be viewed as a kind of de 
facto recognition of it.73
69  Maija Runcis, “The collective strategies of Latvian Second World War refugees adapt-
ing to Swedish society”, Baltic biographies at historical crossroads, ed. by Aili Aarelaid 
Tart and Li Bennich-Björkman (London and New York: Routledge, 2012), 53.
70  See Mikael Byström, Utmaningen: den svenska välfärdsstatens möte med flyktingar i 
andra världskrigets tid (Lund: Nordic Academic Press, 2012).
71  See Curl Ekholm, Balt- och tyskutlämningen 1945–1946: omständigheter kring interner-
ingen i läger i Sverige och utlämningen till Sovjetunionen av f. d. tyska krigsdeltagare 
(Stockholm: Almqvist & Wiksell International, 1984).
72  Janerik Larsson, “Varför var inte balternas sak vår?”, Svensk Tidskrift, 77 (1990), 109.
73  Tõotan ustavaks jääda... Eesti Vabariigi Valitsus 1940–1992, ed. by Mart Orav, Enn 
Nõu (Tartu: Eesti Kirjanduse Selts, 2004), 23, 177.
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Over the post-war decades, some of the World War II refugees or their 
descendants continued propaganda for the cause of Baltic independence, 
facilitating the development of a more pro-Baltic opinion in Sweden. One 
prominent example was the Estonian journalist and liberal politician 
Andres Küng who was active for decades informing Swedish public opin-
ion about Baltic issues. Therefore, while official Swedish policy was hardly 
any cause for Baltic optimism, Sweden by virtue of being a democratic state 
still provided a safe haven for Baltic refugees.
Sweden and the re-emergence of Baltic independence in 1989–91
In some ways, the change in Sweden’s geopolitical situation at the end of the 
Cold War was similar to the one that had taken place at the end of World 
War I. Again, the developments were very favorable at least in principle. 
The fast weakening and then even quicker collapse of the Soviet Union – 
by this point not only a regional power, but a world superpower – meant 
that Sweden’s security situation improved almost immeasurably. And, just 
as had been the case in 1918–20, a row of small nation states emerged on 
the other side of the Baltic Sea, further shielding Sweden from Russia, but 
also forcing it to come to terms with their existence.
This new actualization of the Baltic question must be seen in the context 
of Sweden’s own relative state of crisis at the end of the Cold War. At the 
time, the social democratic welfare state, predicated on the stable growth 
of economy being able to fund the expensive social services, was turn-
ing increasingly unfeasible due to globalization and structural changes in 
world economy. These difficulties, which had made themselves seriously 
felt already at the end of the 1970s, had by 1990 led to a recession and the 
worst economy crisis in Sweden since 1929. Social democrats regained 
power in the early 1980s, following a stint of right-wing governments from 
1976 to 1982, but were now forced to operate in a climate of relentless neo-
liberal criticism advocating a systemic shift in social policy. In an attempt 
to keep up with the times, social democrats abandoned several of their 
traditional policies and came up with “third way” alternatives, some of 
which further contributed to the political and economic tensions instead 
of resolving them.74
Even more importantly, the so-called Nordic balance, a remarkably 
resilient Cold War-era security configuration in the Baltic Sea region which 
74  Urban Klas, Klas Åmark, "Social rights and social security: the Swedish welfare state, 
1900–2000", Scandinavian Journal of History, 26:3 (2001), 172–173. 
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for a long time had facilitated Sweden’s strict neutrality policy, was turn-
ing obsolete by the end of the 1980s. As Soviet influence declined, Finland 
and Norway (the only NATO member state to border the USSR) were los-
ing their role as the frontier states of capitalism, and Sweden, too, had to 
rethink its neutrality in a situation where there “no longer was anything 
to be neutral about”.75 Again, just as at the end of World War I, the seem-
ingly unchangeable reality of confrontation between great powers/super-
powers was unexpectedly replaced by a much more pluralistic security 
architecture.76
It is therefore only natural that when the broad right-wing government 
of Carl Bildt assumed office in September of 1991, it took advantage of these 
widespread expectations of policy innovation, and made a break with sev-
eral long-standing traditions in Swedish politics. One consequence of this 
rethinking of Swedish policy were the harsh retrenchment cuts to the social 
services in 1992, which, enacted together with social democrats in the best 
traditions of Swedish consensus politics, certainly changed the direction 
of Swedish welfare state development even if they did not quite amount to 
dismantling it.77 Another consequence was the opening up to Europe and 
the submission of a Swedish European Union membership application in 
due course. This also meant that the traditionally strict Swedish neutrality 
doctrine was replaced by that of non-alliance in peacetime and only pos-
sible neutrality in the case of war.78 Finally, it was at this point that active 
Swedish support for Baltic independence became firmly established on 
government level with the prime minister Carl Bildt taking keen interest 
in Baltic matters.79
75  Erik Ringmar, “Re-imagining Sweden: the rhetorical battle over EU membership”, 
Scandinavian Journal of History, 23:1–2 (1998), 45. 
76  About the Nordic balance and its disappearance at the end of the Cold War, see 
David Arter, Scandinavian politics today (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 
2016), 379–382.
77  See Peter Starke, Radical welfare state retrenchment: a comparative analysis (New 
York: Palgrave McMillan, 2008), 170–171.
78  Hans Mouritzen, “The Nordic model as a foreign policy instrument: its rise and fall”, 
Journal of Peace Research, 31:1 (1995), 9–21; Kazimierz Musiał, “Reconstructing Nordic 
significance in Europe on the threshold of the 21st century”, Scandinavian Journal of 
History, 34:3 (2009), 287; Bernhard M. Beitelmair, Explaining Sweden’s Baltic policy: 
construction of regionalism in northeastern Europe (München: GRIN Verlag, 2010), 
92–93; Christine Ingebritsen, “Redefining national security: Scandinavia comes out of 
the cold”, Journal of Strategic Studies, 20:3 (1997), 27–44. 
79  See Lars Peter Fredén, Återkomster. Svensk säkerhetspolitik och de baltiska ländernas 
första år i självständighet 1991–1994 (Stockholm: Atlantis, 2006), 9–23; Fredén, För-
vandlingar, 246–247.
420 Ajalooline Ajakiri, 2016, 3/4 (157/158)
The latter development was in certain ways foreshadowed by the atti-
tudes and activities of Swedish diplomats in the emerging Baltic states. 
The Swedish diplomat corps had for a long time been characterized by 
inherent assumed bourgeois identity and a certain sense of bureaucratic 
legalism, which, invested with socialist fervor during the Cold War, had 
produced a generation of highly politicized ideological diplomats such as 
Jean-Christophe Öberg and Pierre Schori.80 From their perspective, Swed-
ish support for Baltic liberation movements was thus conceived of as sim-
ply a matter of justice and democracy, which could now be extended also 
to include the Baltic peoples, although previously voiced primarily with 
regard to issues in the Third World. Therefore, as far as Swedish attitudes 
towards the new Baltic independence were concerned, it was the diplomats 
like Dag Ahlander and Lars Fredén who were the first important policy 
innovators. Their memoirs of this period are furthermore nearly the only 
available source giving a Swedish perspective on these events, making 
them therefore indispensable in trying to understand the development of 
Swedish policy.81
Paradoxically, these early diplomatic activities were also facilitated 
by the old Swedish recognition of the Baltic states’ incorporation into 
the USSR. Even though this had a detrimental effect on the reputation 
of Sweden in the Baltic liberation circles, it also meant that Sweden had 
somewhat freer hands there than the states which had not recognized the 
annexation. In September 1989, when Ahlander was appointed the Swedish 
general consul in Leningrad, he was also tasked with acting as a point of 
contact with the Baltic independence movements and thus became a very 
frequent, nearly weekly visitor to the Baltic capitals.82 When Lars Fredén 
was appointed as the second consul in October the same year, the work 
could intensify and more or less permanent “Swedish offices” were estab-
lished in Tallinn and Riga as “departments” of the general consulate in 
Leningrad. All this amounted to a Swedish diplomatic presence from very 
early on, even if the political activities were concealed under the pretense 
of taking care of consular affairs.83 Thereby, Baltic hopes of making their 
voices heard and interests recognized were again closely connected to Swe-
den, even if the situation was very different from 1918–20.
80  See Gunnar Åselius, “Revolutionen under kristallkulorna – den svenska utrikesför-
valtningen och 1968”, Aktuellt om Historia, 1 (2016), 113–130.
81  Of course it is possible that as new sources become available, a somewhat different 
picture might emerge.
82  Dag Sebastian Ahlander, Spelet om Baltikum (Stockholm: Norstedts, 1992), 11–15, 25–26.
83  Fredén, Förvandlingar, 39–45.
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By experiencing the Baltic liberation movements first-hand, the Swed-
ish diplomats could in due course provide a counterweight to the cautious 
attitudes in Stockholm. One of the earliest memoranda there on the Baltic 
question was written by the foreign office’s Soviet Union specialist, Hans 
Olsson on 18 September 1989; shortly after the Baltic Way demonstration 
on 23 August and ahead of the Swedish minister of environment Brigitta 
Dahl’s visit to all three Baltic republics. Although Olsson’s analysis of the 
political situation in the USSR was astute, he also stated that “for the fore-
seeable future, full independence [for the Baltic states] seems to be out of 
the boundaries of what is realistic”.84
It is of course understandable that just like the politicians of most other 
Western countries, the Swedish foreign office could not predict how fast 
the collapse of the Soviet Union would happen. In the meantime, they were 
inclined to advise the hot-blooded Baltic national separatists to be more 
cautious. With hopes remaining on perestroika and Gorbachev at least 
until the coup d’état attempt in August 1991, the Swedes were afraid that a 
violent response could be unleashed if the situation was further escalated, 
perhaps creating a humanitarian crisis and initiating a new wave of Baltic 
refugees to Sweden just like in 1944.85 At the same time, it is also probable 
that the foreign office, then run by social democrats, also considered how 
a more activist stance in the near neighborhood might spur demands for 
further commitments also in the Third World, thus overextending Swed-
ish resources, or alternatively replace the traditionally social democratic 
solidarity with the Third World with that for the Baltic states, seen, if any-
thing, as a right-wing concern.
Other than a general fear of escalation and Soviet resurgence, Swedish 
policy was unclear, as Lars Fredén also states in his memoirs.86 He links 
this deficiency to some early diplomatic blunders, especially the disas-
trous visit of the Swedish social democratic minister of foreign affairs Sten 
Andersson to the Soviet Baltic Republics in the autumn of 1989. Once there, 
Andersson made a scandalous claim that the Baltic States had never been 
occupied by the USSR. This statement was of course fully in line with offi-
cial Swedish Cold War-era policy, but Andersson’s articulation of it, which 
by then had become a source of shame, left the impression that he was, 
84  Fredén, Förvandlingar, 47–49.
85  See, e. g., the fears expressed in the TV news program Rapport, broadcasted in the 
middle of the coup attempt in Moscow on August 19, 1991. Immigration authorities in 
the south of Sweden were interviewed concerning Swedish preparations for receiving 
tens of thousands of Baltic refugees.
86  Fredén, Förvandlingar, 18.
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at best, ignorant, or, at worst, dismissive of Baltic aspirations towards the 
restatement of their independence.87 By this point, even Arnold Rüütel – 
the official head of the Soviet Estonian government – had been quoted in 
Swedish press as saying that both the Molotov–Ribbentrop Pact of 1939 
and the incorporation of Estonia into the Soviet Union in 1940 were ille-
gal and therefore not valid.88
Although the Swedish government was lagging behind the times, it was 
also keeping in touch with the Baltic liberation movements and Swedish 
diplomats soon came to appreciate the Baltic viewpoints.89 Indeed, Swe-
den’s lack of clear policy was useful in that they could ignore certain larger 
questions. As Fredén points out, he was lucky to not to have made any 
declarations comparable to the notorious Chicken Kiev speech of George 
Bush in the summer of 1991 – not because of his superior understanding, 
but rather because he was never instructed about how to deal with these 
issues of principal importance.90
Around 1990 the latest, genuine sympathies for the cause of Baltic inde-
pendence became evident in Swedish political circles and even the soci-
ety at large. The Baltic liberation movements gathered active support in 
the Swedish parliament91 and the series of cross-party “Monday meetings” 
(Måndagsrörelsen) began in March 1990 on Norrmalmstorg in Stockholm, 
where support for Baltic independence was articulated.92 Swedish public 
opinion thus seemed ready to work on its guilty conscience over decades 
of official indifference, but it also expressed its admiration for the Baltic 
strategy of nonviolent political change, exemplified in such mass demon-
strations as the Baltic Way and the singing revolution.93 As expected, sup-
port for the emerging Baltic states was most notable in right-wing circles, 
but many social democrats, too, were now willing to overcome their tradi-
tional passivism, even if they, as admitted by Brigitta Dahl, never quite felt 
at home on Norrmalmstorg shoulder to shoulder with the conservatives.94 
87  Fredén, Förvandlingar, 51–57, 242–243.
88  Ahlander, Spelet om Baltikum, 60.
89  See examples of Lars Fredén’s insights received from direct communication with 
Baltic politicians: Fredén, Förvandlingar, 26, 68, 186.
90  Ibid., 259–262.
91  Ibid., 141.
92  Ibid., 246.
93  Krister Wahlbäck, Baltisk befrielse. Svenska insatser för friheten (Jarl Hjalmarson 
Stiftelse, 2012), 19.
94  Sverige och Baltikums frigörelse: två vittnesseminarier om storpolitik kring Östersjön 
1989–1994, ed. by Thomas Lundén and Torbjörn Nilsson (Stockholm: Samtidshistoriska 
Institutet, Södertörns Högskola, 2008), 61.
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The efforts of Swedish diplomats and politicians were furthermore boosted 
by the activities of the sizable exile Baltic community in Sweden.95
More concrete steps also followed. Already in the beginning of 1990, 
the representatives of the newly elected Baltic parliaments (Supreme Sovi-
ets) received an official invitation to visit Sweden. Similarly, in early Sep-
tember 1990, Baltic representatives were invited to an international con-
ference on the health of the Baltic Sea in Ronneby, Sweden, meant to give 
them a chance to appear in a large international forum not concerned with 
the delicate security issues. Lithuanians nevertheless declined the invita-
tion after it was demanded by Moscow that the Baltic representatives par-
ticipate as members of the larger Soviet delegation.96 Sweden also allowed 
the opening of Estonian, Latvian and Lithuanian information offices in 
Stockholm in spring 1991. On 3 March, even a polling station for the refer-
endum on Estonia’s independence was set up on the premises of Estonia’s 
office after oral consent was obtained from the Swedish foreign ministry.97
Yet there was also some continuity with the previous Swedish tradition 
of avoiding active Baltic politics, motivated by the need to appease Russia. 
Such viewpoints remained above all connected to left-wing circles, and ini-
tially also the cautious social-democratic government which remained in 
power until autumn 1991. Significantly, Lars Fredén mentions in his mem-
oirs how one of his memorandums in February 1991, arguing that Baltic 
developments were important for Swedish national security interests, and 
that Sweden needed to come to terms with the possibility of Baltic inde-
pendence, was deemed “too activist, which back then was certainly no 
praise at the Swedish foreign office.”98
In hindsight, Fredén has pointed out that the Swedish cautiousness in 
formulating a clear policy – let alone an “activist” policy – must above all 
be seen as a feature of the immensity of the task at hand. Decisions about 
how to handle the independence movements in the Baltic states touched 
upon the most central Swedish security issues that had remained unchal-
lenged since the defense negotiations following the end of World War II.99 
95  Fredén, Förvandlingar, 245–246.
96  Ibid., 141, 143–146.
97  Aadu Must, “The formation of Estonian diplomacy: the Estonian foreign delegation 
in Stockholm in 1918 & the Estonian Information Office in Stockholm in 1991”, Inde-
pendence of the Baltic states: origins, causes, and consequences: a comparision of the 
crucial years 1918–1919 and 1990–1991, ed. by Eberhard Demm, Roger Noel and William 
L. Urban (Chicago: Lithuanian Research and Studies Center, 1996), 8.
98  Fredén, Förvandlingar, 185.
99  Ibid., 243–244. Back then, the Swedish-initiated talks for the creation of a Nordic 
defense union, meant to hinder Norwegian and Danish NATO membership, ultimately 
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At the same time, the tradition that was being eroded was in fact an even 
older one: the one that had come into being as the policy of 1812 and had 
played a central role in Swedish thinking in foreign affairs ever since.
In spite of this mental challenge of having to overturn long-held tradi-
tions of policymaking, Sweden found the strength to be remarkably proac-
tive and supportive of the Baltic leadership. This was true not least during 
the January 1991 events in Vilnius and Riga, which became something of a 
milestone in accelerating the development of a pro-Baltic Swedish policy,100 
and was reported on Swedish television in an alarmist manner, in marked 
contrast to the previously relatively relaxed reporting on events in the Bal-
tic countries. The same was repeated during the seismic failure of the coup 
attempt in August 1991, bringing about the collapse of the Soviet Union 
and the full independence declarations of the Baltic states which had not 
yet issued one (Lithuania had done so already in 1990).
Unlike its Nordic neighbors Iceland and Denmark, however, Sweden 
was not among the first foreign countries to recognize the restoration of 
the independence of the Baltic states. In fact, it was only the twentieth state 
(on 27 August 1991) to issue a declaration about the “re-establishment” of 
diplomatic relations, using a formulation which naturally only belonged 
to those states that had never formally recognized the annexation of the 
Baltic states. Now, the social democratic Swedish government and the 
foreign minister Sten Andersson seemed to engage in purposeful politi-
cal amnesia, making it look like the recognition of the annexation of 1940 
had never happened.101
Beyond the support for independence
Just like in the aftermath of World War I, the ever-present Swedish con-
cern with Russia – “a finlandisation of our brains”102 – was exacerbated by 
a set of more particular fears or problems affecting engagement with the 
Baltic states. After August 1991, the main Swedish concern was no longer 
an immediate Soviet backlash, but rather that the Baltic states, having now 
regained their independence, would not turn into “failed states”, plagued 
by undemocratic regimes, failure of economy and mass unemployment, 
or the presence of ex-Soviet troops as a long-term destabilizing factor.103
failed and resulted in the Nordic balance as they came to be known.
100  Fredén, Förvandlingar, 149–183.
101  Ibid., 222–223.
102  Larsson, “Varför var inte balternas sak vår?”, 109.
103  Lundén, Nilsson, Sverige och Baltikums frigörelse, 98.
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Even though this too, can be seen as an expression of age-old Swed-
ish cautiousness – Fredén remarks how it was somewhat difficult for the 
Swedes, himself included, “to grasp that the Soviet Union did not exist 
anymore”104 – the new Swedish concern amounted to remarkable policy 
innovation in other ways. In November 1991, in a major political meeting 
in the Baltic question, Fredén argued to a compliant audience that whether 
Sweden understood it or not, it was a "regional great power" with regard 
to the Baltic states, due to geographic adjacency and shared history. 
Therefore, the resources at Sweden’s disposal for foreign aid and foreign 
policy development were to be distributed accordingly.105 
Thus, unlike in the interwar era, the relative lack of confidence in the 
future of the Baltic states did not lead to a cold shoulder from Sweden but 
rather facilitated generous foreign aid to the Baltic states and close Swedish 
engagement with crucial issues such as the removal of Soviet troops from 
their Baltic bases and the citizenship question of the Russian-speaking 
immigrants in Estonia and Latvia. As before, it was recognizably in Swe-
den’s own security interests that the Baltic states would remain independ-
ent and turn into “normal” European states, but this time, Sweden had the 
self-confidence, means and willingness to actively help them.
The spread of Swedish soft power on the eastern coast of the Baltic Sea 
not only benefited the emerging Baltic states, but it also reassured Sweden 
that it still had a positive international role to play in these changed cir-
cumstances. By taking on the role of managers of Baltic post-soviet tran-
sition, Sweden and the other Nordic countries could strengthen their own 
international reputation,106 and keep alive the traditions of norm entrepre-
neurship that in the previous decades had been directed towards the Third 
World, but now could be directed at the Baltics as well.107 To conservatives 
as well as some social democrats this represented a welcome alignment 
of Swedish ideals with Swedish policies. Of course others saw the Baltic 
commitment as competing with Third World solidarity, channeling off 
resources from the aid budget, and effectively diffusing Swedish “active 
foreign policy” by aligning it with general “Western” policy, thus defang-
ing Swedish neutralism. This might have been the reason that the sums of 
money earmarked for the Baltic states remained laughably small compared 
104  Fredén, Återkomster, 36.
105  Ibid., 29.
106  See e. g. Beitelmair, Explaining Sweden’s Baltic Policy, 18.
107  See Annika Bergman, “Adjacent internationalism: the concept of solidarity and 
post-Cold War Nordic–Baltic relations”, Cooperation and Conflict, 41:1 (2006), 73–97. 
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to the overall Swedish foreign aid budget.108 But in hindsight, there is nev-
ertheless no reason to regard this initiative anything but a success, and the 
“normalization” of the Baltic states happened faster than perhaps anyone 
had dared to believe.109
A principal difference in Swedish attitudes made itself felt even in areas 
where one finds some continuities with earlier Swedish skepticism and 
paternalism. Unlike in 1918–19, Baltic political elites were no longer sus-
pected of being too “red”, but they were certainly suspected of being too 
nationalistic, idealistic and maybe too uncultured to participate in “real” 
politics without some further learning. Yet now Swedish politicians tended 
to take a more active role in engaging with the Baltic politicians and to 
point out when they were acting “tactically wrong”, even if they believed 
in the justness of their cause in principle.110
Just as in 1919, there were fears that Baltic nationalism would lead to 
oppression of minorities. Whereas in 1919, the minority in question had 
been the tiny Baltic German one, in 1991 it was the much more numerous 
and mostly working-class Russian minority that in Estonia amounted to 
up to one third, and in Latvia even up to one half of the population. The 
legal context was also somewhat different. Whereas in 1919, the issue had 
been the land reform and its disrespect for private property, in the early 
1990s the issue was the citizenship and the alleged disrespect for the civic 
rights of the minority population after the restoration of independence.111 
The change reflected the development of international norms from the 
nurturing of minority rights to a focus on human rights. But unlike in 
1918–20, Sweden actually did much to communicate the Baltic viewpoint 
to other international actors.112
Just as in interwar era, there was also a pressing military issue. This time, 
however, the question was not the threat of an outright war with Russia, 
but rather the issue of when and how completely Russia would draw out its 
troops from its Baltic military bases. The Swedish response was also very 
different. Whereas Sweden in 1918–20 had reacted with near-total unwill-
ingness to provide help to the Baltic states, it now became involved in the 
negotiations, even if not overtly, to encourage Russian withdrawal.113
108  Fredén, Återkomster, 139.
109  Lundén, Nilsson, Sverige och Baltikums frigörelse, 98, 109.
110  Fredén, Återkomster, 21.
111  See ibid., 89–106.
112  See ibid., 108–130; Wahlbäck, Baltisk befrielse, 75–81.
113  Fredén, Återkomster, 65-88; Wahlbäck, Baltisk befrielse, 31–36, 47–66.
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A novel part of the Baltic-Swedish discourse were the environmen-
tal questions. Some of the earliest direct contacts between Sweden and 
the Baltic states, such as the visit of the Swedish minister of environment 
Brigitta Dahl to all three in the autumn of 1989,114 were the result of con-
cerns over environmental issues, which in turn drew upon preexisting 
contacts established already during Cold War era (HELCOM and others) 
and oceanographic cooperation between the Nordics and the Warsaw Pact 
countries, one result of which was the Baltic participation in the Ronneby 
conference mentioned above.115 Much of the Soviet (and Baltic) public pro-
test during the 1980s had also often forged itself as “environmentalism”. 
This was doubly beneficial for Baltic-Swedish cooperation since it provided 
a shared, mutual concern for the Swedes including social democrats and 
Green Party figures who would otherwise have found it difficult to take 
on what in Swedish politics had been a traditionally right-wing concern.
Conclusions
The somewhat gradual but nevertheless remarkably fast change in Swed-
ish attitudes towards Baltic independence in 1989–91 was a product of both 
domestic and international developments. The space for policy change that 
opened up in Sweden after the social democratic welfare state had become 
unsustainable in its traditional form, combined with the almost bloodless 
decline and collapse of Soviet power, created a situation where engagement 
with the emerging Baltic states was essentially a welcome opportunity for 
Sweden to reassert in changed circumstances both its previously-held posi-
tion as an international champion of democratization, as well as to finally 
adopt its long-missing role as a regional power with a natural interest in 
supporting its neighboring states. This solution was acceptable to Swedish 
conservatives as a form of compensation for past Swedish isolationism and 
willingness to appease the Soviet Union, but it also satisfied at least some 
social democrats as a way of continuing the post-World War II Swedish 
traditions of activist internationalism and foreign aid.
As we have seen, previous Swedish skepticism towards the Baltic states 
during their previous period of independence can most readily be explained 
with the belief in the “eternal” character of Russia and its territorial and 
security interests. It was certainly also influenced by negative prejudices 
114  Lundén, Nilsson, Sverige och Baltikums frigörelse, 20–23.
115  See e. g. David Isaksson, “Visst blev Liepaja renare!”, Baltikum-Sverige, möten över 
havet, ed. by David Isaksson (Stockholm: Sida, 2004), 62–66.
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towards Baltic politicians and their capability to bear the long-term burden 
of independence. Thereby committed to remain only minimally engaged 
with the Baltic states, Sweden even came to see them (in particular Esto-
nia) as a competitor for the sympathies of Finland, rather than as possible 
partners in a broader federation of Baltic Sea states, as the Baltic politi-
cians themselves would have wished to be seen. Ultimately, this cautious-
ness appeared to have been well-founded, as the Baltic states were indeed 
swallowed up by the Soviet Union in the matter of a couple of decades. To 
what extent this could have been avoided by closer cooperation with the 
Scandinavian states will always remain an open question.
However, beyond all its concerns in this early period, Sweden did recog-
nize the existence of the Baltic states as being in principal Swedish interests 
and was therefore prepared to support the Baltic states using noncommit-
tal means. While excluding close political and military cooperation, these 
included their de facto and subsequently de jure recognition, a plethora of 
economic and cultural contacts and visits of high-level dignitaries. Some 
of this – admittedly very low-key – support also carried over to the Cold 
War era, as evidenced by the generally positive treatment of Baltic refugees.
In the crucial period of 1989–91 when Soviet influence declined to the 
point of the collapse, and Sweden had already developed an international 
renown for moralistic foreign policy, it could hardly treat the Baltic question 
in quite as pragmatic and “valueless” way as it had in the interwar period. 
Furthermore, Sweden also bore the burden of guilt over having previously 
done so. It was for those reasons that Swedish policy, which in principle 
had long recognized Sweden’s interest in the existence of independent Bal-
tic states, was able to shed much of its traditional concern with appeasing 
Russia, and actively took on the cause of Baltic independence, thereby for 
the first time also corresponding to the expectations of the Baltic politi-
cians. This change became more marked over time, developing from the 
unfortunate comments of Sten Andersson to the pro-Baltic politics of the 
government of Carl Bildt, and for a long time, the Swedish attitudes still 
largely proceeded from the question of “how much it would be possible to 
help the Balts without angering Moscow”. Yet from autumn 1991 onwards, 
this new enthusiasm for Baltic independence that had appeared and taken 
root as a form of low-level “duck politics”, or “salami tactics” (to use Hans 
Olsson’s formulation)116 was successfully made one of the principal Swed-
ish foreign policy issues, laying the ground for the deep political and 
116  The politics of small steps without big words and bombastic rhetoric. See Lundén, 
Nilsson, Sverige och Baltikums frigörelse, 33–34.
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economic integration between the Scandinavian and the Baltic states that 
has come into being in the following decades.
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Kokkuvõte: Rootsi poliitilised hoiakud Balti riikide iseseisvuse 
suhtes lühikesel 20. sajandil
Artikkel vaatleb Rootsi suhtumist Balti riikide iseseisvusesse nn lühikesel 
20. sajandil (1914–91), keskendudes eeskätt nende iseseisvumis- (1918–20) ja 
taasiseseisvumisperioodile (1989–91). Esimest ajajärku iseloomustas Rootsi 
skeptilisus Balti riikide võime suhtes oma iseseisvust pikema aja vältel säi-
litada. Seda umbusku saab seletada eelkõige veendumusega, et Venemaa 
nõrgenemine Esimese maailmasõja lõpuks oli ajutine ning see püüab kao-
tatud Läänemere-äärsed territooriumid (peale Soome) oma “loomulike” 
territoriaalsete ja strateegiliste huvide tõttu esimesel võimalusel tagasi 
vallutada. Oma rolli mängisid ka negatiivsed stereotüübid Baltikumi kui 
omamoodi “metsiku ida” kohta, kus arvati lokkavat natsionalismi ja bol-
ševismi ning poliitikuid kahtlustati kultuurituses ja mõõdutundetuses. 
Ühtlasi avaldas mõju Rootsis juba enne Esimese maailmasõja lõppu ala-
nud sotsiaaldemokraatiliku partei tugevnemine, mis tähendas, et nii Teise 
maailmasõja eelsel kui ka järgsel ajal eelistas Rootsi säilitada oma neutrali-
teedipoliitikat ning toetuda pigem laiapõhjalistele rahvusvahelistele orga-
nisatsioonidele kui regionaalsetele, võimalike otseste julgeolekuriskidega 
seotud liidusuhetele. Kõige selle tõttu otsustas sõdadevahelise aja Rootsi 
jääda Balti riikide tuleviku osas äärmiselt ettevaatlikule seisukohale ning 
vältida nende suhtes igasuguste poliitiliste ja sõjaliste kohustuste võtmist. 
Püüti isegi takistada Balti riikide koostööd Soomega, kuna Rootsi soovis 
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säilitada viimast eraldiseisva puhverriigina. Samal ajal Rootsis siiski mõis-
teti, et iseseisvate Balti riikide säilimine on põhimõtteliselt Rootsi huvides 
ning toetati neid erinevate mittesiduvate meetmetega, mille hulka kuulus 
rahvusvahelise olukorra stabiliseerumise järel ka nende ametlik de jure 
tunnustamine. (Taolisel heasoovlikkusel oli oma järjepidevus ka Balti 
pagulaste vastuvõtmise ja nende üldjuhul hea koht lemise näol Teise maa-
ilmasõja lõpujärgus ja järel.)
Balti riikide iseseisvuse kaotamine 1939. ja 1940. aasta sündmustes oli 
Rootsi jaoks seega ootuspärane ning Rootsi oli üks vähestest lääneriiki-
dest, kes nende Nõukogude Liitu inkorporeerimist ametlikult tunnustas.
Teise maailmasõja järgsetel kümnenditel kogus Rootsi rahvusvahelist 
tuntust aktiivselt moralistliku välispoliitikaga, võttes endale kolmanda 
maailma riikide demokratiseerimisprotsesside toetaja ja helde sponsori 
rolli, jättes aga samal ajal julgeolekukaalutlustel tähelepanuta inimõiguste 
rikkumised ja demokraatia defitsiidi Nõukogude Liidus, sh selle Balti vaba-
riikides. Aastatel 1989–91, kui Nõukogude mõjuvõim kiirelt vähenes kuni 
riigi enda kokkuvarisemiseni välja, oli Rootsil aga raske jääda Balti küsi-
muses sama skeptiliseks ja pragmaatiliseks kui sõdadevahelistel ja külma 
sõja aastatel. Ühtlasi oli süveneva majanduskriisi tingimustes saanud Rootsi 
sisepoliitikas aeg küpseks olulisteks muutusteks, mille väljenduseks oli 
eelkõige 1991. aasta sügisel võimule tulnud Carl Bildti valitsuse uus, vara-
semast sotsiaaldemokraatliku heaoluriigi ja range neutraliteedipoliitika 
mudelist otsustavalt kaugenev poliitika. Balti riikide jaoks tähendas see, et 
Rootsi võttis endale nende postsotsialistliku ülemineku toetaja ja konsul-
tandi rolli, aidates neid muuhulgas tundlikes küsimustes, nagu vene vähe-
muse kodakondsusprobleem ja Nõukogude vägede väljaviimine. Selli ne 
roll oli aktsepteeritav Rootsi moderaatidele, kuna see andis riigile tagasi 
selle ”loomupärase” rolli regionaalse suurvõimuna Läänemere regioonis 
ning ühtlasi korvas süütunnet varasemate aastakümnete isolatsionismi 
üle. Selline suund oli vastuvõetav ka vähemalt osale sotsiaaldemokraa-
tidest, kes nägid selles võimalust Rootsi varasema aktiivselt moralistliku 
välispoliitika jätkamiseks.
